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Social Investing, IOLTA* and the Law of
Trusts: The Settlor's Case Against the
Political Use of Charitable and
Client Funds
Charles E. Rounds, Jr.**
Almost all political issues have become legal issues these days,
and it is also increasingly true that many legal cases are essentially political.
L. Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal'
There's a debate on whether or not [social investing is] really a
movement. I think it's a movement in the sense that it's very
political. The reason it's political is because it involves the movement of capital. If you're going to change society in any appreciable fashion, the most rapid way you can change it is to move
substantial amounts of capital, meaning money, because the only
thing that's understood in our society is the control of money,
and the control of huge amounts of capital.
John Harrington in the Socialist Review2

I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, trustees hold title to property worth more
than two trillion dollars.3 Today some of this economic power
serves political ends. This article considers whether the person
who creates a trust lawfully can prevent or halt subsequent politInterest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts
Professor Rounds is a tenured member of the faculty of Suffolk University Law
School, Boston, Massachusetts.
1. Crovitz, Kinder, Gentler Reform for Legal Services Corporations, Wall St. J., Jan.
31, 1990, at A19, col. 3.
2. Harrington, Putting Your Money Where Your Politics Are: Is the Left Ready to Do
Business?, SOCIALIST REV., Spring 1987, at 65 (Mr. Harrington was associated with
Franklin Research and Development, a money management organization).
3. An estimated $2.3 trillion currently are administered in the United States in pension funds alone, of which $700 billion are assets held in public employee retirement
funds. See Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 3. "Total university endowments alone
doubled between 1984 and 1987 to $47.9 billion and increased an additional 14% last
year." Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1990, at A10, col. 2.
*

**
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ical exploitation of the trust. Charitable funds and client trust accounts are particularly vulnerable to such exploitation.
Trustees are being pressured, for example, to divest charitable
trust portfolios of interests in companies doing business in South
Africa. The purpose of such pressure is to assist indigenous groups
in their campaign to end state-sanctioned racial segregation and to
influence indirectly the domestic politics of the United States.4
Another movement is attempting to influence the policies and
practices of Northern Ireland's political system.5 A similar movement against the government of the People's Republic of China is
in its infancy.6 Many trustees of charitable trusts already have
4.

Consider, for example, the following developments in the "divestment" movement:
TransAfrica, the small organization that deserves much of the credit for making apartheid an issue in the United States, was founded in 1977 by the Congressional Black Caucus. The Caucus, a group of some twenty members of the
House, established TransAfrica in the hope of representing black African (and
Caribbean) interests to Congress and influencing U.S. policy toward South Africa ........
In 1985 and again in 1986 the South Africa issue went through a cycle of
spring rallies and protests leading to late summer political climaxes in Congress.
This annual cycle had much more to do with the rhythms of American politics
than with events in South Africa. Indeed, the continuing violence in South
Africa did not govern the surges of publicity and political activity in the United
States. Rather, the anniversaries of Martin Luther King's birth and death became prominent dates in the divestment and sanctions campaigns, explicitly
bringing these into the context of American racial politics........
The divestment and sanctions campaign was presented as an apolitical good
cause with mainly humanitarian stakes at issue; but the campaign had sharp
ideological and political undertones.
Martin, Attacking Reagan by Way of Pretoria, 31 ORBis 293, 295, 298, 300 (1987).
Angry MIT students scuffled with campus and Metropolitan Police yesterday
while confronting their board of trustees and demanding its members pull the
school's investments from firms doing business in South Africa.
The group of 70 students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology seized
the chance to raise concerns about MIT's role in South Africa as MIT Corporation members visited the Cambridge campus for a quarterly meeting.
"It's really important that political statements be made now to keep the sanctions issue alive," said Ron Francis, an MIT graduate student and member of
the Coalition Against Apartheid, which helped organize the rally.
Boston Herald, Mar. 3, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
5. On December 11, 1990, Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis signed into
law a bill which prohibits the City of Boston from investing trust funds in a corporation
operating in Northern Ireland, unless such corporation "adheres to principals of nondiscrimination in employment and freedom of workplace opportunity." Act approved Dec.
11, 1990, ch. 293, 1990 Mass. Acts.
6. Fang Lizhi, an outspoken opponent of the current government of the People's Republic of China, recommended that western companies use their economic leverage to
prod the Chinese government to recognize the freedom aspirations of the Chinese people.
Cuomo, Chinese Dissident Advocates Divestment, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1989, at A17, col.
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yielded to this pressure to practice politically oriented social
investing.7
Lawyer-trustees are not insulated from these forces. Most
states, for example, now encourage or compel lawyers who administer client trust funds to combine "nominal" amounts in IOLTA
pools. IOLTA administrators then divert the income from these
pools to organizations that purport to serve the legal needs of the
community. In California, however, one such ostensibly charitable
organization has financed with IOLTA income a challenge to a
parental-consent abortion statute.8 In Massachusetts, a recipient
of IOLTA income has been involved in legislative redistricting initiatives and the filing of class action suits.9 In 1988, an IOLTA
7. See 112 Colleges That Have Divested, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., May 14, 1986,
at 2 (listing the institutions of higher education that have sold all or part of their holdings
in companies with operations in South Africa).
8. IOLTA income grants are made from the Legal Services Trust Fund, which is
administered by the offices of the State Bar of California through the Legal Services Trust
Fund Commission (Commission). The Commission selects California IOLTA income
grant recipients. One such recipient is the National Center for Youth Law (NCYL).
NCYL also receives funds from Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a federal agency.
NCYL represented plaintiffs in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214
Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989). That case challenged the constitutionality of
a California statute which would require minors seeking abortions to obtain the prior
consent of a parent or a court order. Cordova & Baxter, California IOLTA Faces New
Challenge to Control, 6 IOLTA UPDATE, No. 2, at 6 (1989). LSC reduced its 1990 grant
to NCYL because the Van de Camp plaintiffs were not indigents. The Commission, however, continues to support the prochoice political activities of NCYL with the income
from client trust funds. PR Newswire (Jan. 4, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current
1988-file).
9. The Boston Bar Foundation in fiscal years 1988, 1989, and 1990 funneled IOLTA
monies to the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights for its "general support." 14 Projects
Benefitfrom IOLTA Grants, BOSTON B.A. UPDATE, Oct. 1989, at 1, 4; 20 ProjectsBenefit
from BBF IOLTA Grants, MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, Oct. 15, 1990, at 19. Information on
the Committee's political activities has surfaced in the lay press and in the Foundation's
fundraising correspondence:
Minority rights advocates are mounting a congressional district challenge
that could force three heavyweight congressmen . . . to either move or run
against each other in a single Boston district in 1992.
The motive is to pave the way for the potential election of Boston's first black
congressman....
That effort is part of an ambitious plan by the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights to use the 1990 Census to shake up power "at every level throughout the
state...
[The C]ommittee won major state and city redistricting battles in 1983 and
1987. ...
Boston Herald, Dec. 22, 1989, at 5, col 1. "(The] Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
has for over twenty years provided pro-bono representation to racial and ethnic minority
citizens.... Seventy one cases were handled in fiscal '87, over eighty in 1988. Many of
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income grant was made to the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union. 10
In most cases the political exploitation of this flow of IOLTA income occurs without the clients' knowledge or informed consent.
IOLTA tests the limits of state power. On the one hand, tax
monies may be appropriated for political purposes.I On the other
hand, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Keller v. State
Bar 12 that the use of a lawyer's nonentrusted compulsory dues 3 by
an integrated bar to finance political and ideological activities with
which the lawyer himself disagrees violates his first amendment
rights.14 This infringement occurs when such expenditures are not
necessary for the regulation of the legal profession.' 5 Keller, however, did not address the political use of income generated by client
funds entrusted to lawyers.
Social investing tests the limits of a trustee's discretion, particularly the limits of a trustee's discretion to use trust funds for political purposes in the absence of an express or implied grant of
authority by the trust settlor. Commentators have considered
some aspects of the issue. In 1980, Professors Langbein and Posner applied classic trust law principles to the social investing of
trust property and found the practice troubling.' 6 They, however,
focused on the adverse impact that social investing may have on
interests other than those of the settlor 7 and on the possible legal
these are class actions .. " Solicitation letter from Rudolph F. Pierce, President of the
Boston Bar Foundation, to colleagues (entitled "Annual Giving '89").
10. Specifically, the Connecticut Bar Foundation made "some small [IOLTA income] grants" in 1988 to the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union (CCLU) and the Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund. Telephone interview with Quintin
Johnstone, President of the Connecticut Bar Foundation (July 2, 1990) (conducted by
Reid Parrington of the Connecticut Probate Law Journal Association). The statute that
permitted these grants, however, subsequently was amended to limit potential IOLTA
fund recipients to "agencies whose principal purpose is providing legal services to the
poor." Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-81c(a) (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis
added)). The CCLU did not reapply for a grant in 1989 and likely would be precluded
from receiving future IOLTA grants. Id.
11. See Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1167, 767 P. 2d 1020, 1029, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 542, 551 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 110 S.Ct. 2228 (1990).
12. 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
13. An integrated or mandatory bar is "an association of attorneys in which membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law in a State." Id. at 2231.
14. Id. at 2232.
15. Id. at 2236.
16. See Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV.
72 (1980). "We conclude that the duty of loyalty, the prudent man rule, and the cognate
doctrines, which govern both pension funds and trust investment generally, forbid social
investing in its current form." Id. at 76.
17. Langbein and Posner briefly allude to a settlor's interest in the trustee's investment practices:
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consequences to a trustee in the event that social investing causes
economic injury to the trust."8
Some thought also has been given to interests, if any, retained by
a settlor. For example, a 1949 note appearing in the Harvard Law
Review' 9 questioned the position, long held by Professor Scott and
others,2 0 that no rights of enforcement are reserved by a nonbeneficiary, nontrustee settlor of an irrevocable trust in the absence of
language to the contrary.2 ' In 1984, Professor Gaubatz suggested
that a settlor has an "expectation interest" in having the terms of
the trust carried out. 22 Neither the note nor Professor Gaubatz's
article, however, discussed the practice of social investing.
This Article partially closes the circle of analysis by exploring
the possibility that the settlor of a trust has a protectable expectation interest in not having the trust property socially invested or
otherwise exploited to further the political agenda of the trustee or
others. The IOLTA system provides a case study in the political
exploitation of revocable trusts. The practice of socially investing
Past donors-more likely their heirs or successors-may claim that since social investing constitutes a diversion from the educational purposes for which
the funds were given, it breaches an implied or express condition and ought to
trigger defeasance of the funds in favor of the donor. In Illinois, legislation in
force since 1874 denies to universities the "power to divert any gift . . . from the
specific purpose designed by the donor." Donors would have a strong argument against applying the cy pres doctrine in order to prevent defeasance, since
cy pres applies only when it "becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the original charitable purpose." Thus, trustees who yield to pressures to divert endowment funds from education to other causes are exposing
their endowments to the restitutionary claims of donors and heirs.
Id. at 110 (footnotes omitted).
18. See id. at 96-112. Langbein and Posner consider how such injury can be defined
and quantified. See id. at 77-96. The authors conclude that "the usual forms of social
investing involve a combination of reduced diversification and higher administrative costs
not offset by net consumption gains to the investment beneficiaries." Id. at 76.
19. Note, Right of a Settlor to Enforce a Private Trust, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1370
(1949).
20. See, e.g., 2 A. ScoT, TRUSTS § 200.1 (1939); 1 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 42 (1935).
21. The author questioned the widely held assumption that, "in the absence of express retention of supervisory powers or the availability of indirect relief, neither the
settlor nor his surviving representatives may maintain an action against a trustee to compel the performance of a trust or enjoin a breach." The author suggested that "[t]his
assumption, which leaves the supervision of trusts exclusively to the beneficiaries and the
trustee, together with courts of equity, has also been accepted by the text writers without
qualification despite the almost complete absence of judicial decision on the question."
Note, supra note 19, at 1371.
22. Gaubatz, GrantorEnforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62
N.C.L. REV. 905, 941 (1984).
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charitable funds serves the same function with respect to irrevocable trusts.
This author concludes that a settlor, under certain circumstances, possesses a right grounded in the law of trusts to enjoin the
trustee from engaging in political activity with the trust property.
It is suggested, therefore, that a lawyer advise each client, before
the establishment of the lawyer-client relationship, of any potential
political uses of the client's funds. Trustees of charitable trusts
would have a similar duty of advance disclosure. A settlor-benefactor who does not wish a charitable contribution to become the
subject of political exploitation should include language in the trust
instrument reserving to himself and others the right to direct the
trustee to cease use of the trust property for such purposes. Adequate disclosure and express provisions should help avoid confrontations over the political use of trust property, but clarity of
language is critical.
Clarity of language is also critical to meaningful debate of the
issues arising from IOLTA programs and social investing practices. Proponents and opponents of these programs and practices
have failed to define the key terms of the discourse, specifically
political activity, ideology, moral behavior, and charitable activity.
Advocates stifle debate merely by labeling a questioned activity as
either charitable or immoral, rather than political. Therefore, in
order to narrow and facilitate this discussion, the author now defines these terms.
Politicalactivity is activity intended to influence a domestic or
foreign state's exercise of its power to limit certain personal rights
and privileges, raise tax monies, administer and dispose of its property, take by eminent domain, or conduct its foreign policy. In
other words, political activity is intended to influence the state's
exercise of legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative
power. 23
23.

Political activity has been described as "the process by which authoritative deci-

sions about who gets what in society are made." See J. EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND THE

4 (1973). Unlike charitable activity, political activity directs its efforts
at the legitimate coercive functions of the state. If a trustee publicly announces that it is
culling out the stock of a bank doing business in China from the trust portfolio to exert
pressure on the United States Congress to enact legislation or on the President to issue an
executive order that would limit the rights of United States citizens to do business in
China, then the trustee is using the trust property for the trustee's own political purposes.
If the trustee openly or secretly culls out the target company from the portfolio because,
in the opinion of the trustee, the social and political unrest in China is likely to jeopardize
the short- or long-term health of the target company, then the trustee's act of disinvestment is impelled by economic, not political, considerations. The act is no less economiLEGAL PROCESS
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It is for others to fashion a general working definition of ideolcally motivated because it incidentally may influence the Chinese government's domestic
exercise of its instruments of physical and economic coercion or the United States government's limitation of a citizen's right to transact business abroad. If political activity is
limited to activity intended to solicit the state's involvement in a particular objective, then
perhaps the erosion of the distinction between charity and politics may be halted. See 4A
W. FRATCHER, Scor ON TRUSTS §§ 374.4-.5 (4th ed. 1989). This erosion surely
originates in a drift away from the relatively objective criteria of the Statute of Charitable
Uses. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
The state's involvement in limiting certain personal rights and privileges, raising tax
monies, administering and disposing its property, exercising its right to take by eminent
domain, and conducting its foreign policy can result from the actions of any one or more
of the four functions of government. It long has been acknowledged that the acts of the
executive, judicial, and administrative functions are in practice subtle legislative acts. See
B. LEVY, CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING 39-46 (1938); M. COHEN,
LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 112-47 (1967). One need only witness the action or inaction of an attorney general exercising prosecutorial or enforcement discretion, a commissioner exercising administrative discretion, or a judge exercising judicial discretion to
know that the process of legislation is at work not only in the legislative branch, but in all
branches and functions of government. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 108-09.
The state's coercive involvement in taxation and appropriation, eminent domain, and
foreign policy is self-evident. The police, the state's domestic instrument of economic and
physical coercion, enforces the laws that relate to the transfer of property between an
individual and the state. The state's army, its extraterritorial instrument of economic and
physical coercion, buttresses its foreign policy.
The state's coercive involvement in the allocation of certain rights and privileges, however, is not always self-evident to the trust administrator. The judicial remedy of busing
is a dramatic example. The state's institution of an involuntary busing program arguably
limits the right of a Caucasian child to have state services allocated on the basis of criteria
unrelated to race. Conversely, the state's failure to institute or its dismantling of an involuntary busing program arguably limits a non-Caucasian child's right to a remedy for
the alleged past failure of the state to allocate governmental services on the basis of criteria unrelated to race.
It is important to test the proposed definition of political activity in the areas of nonproperty rights (personal rights and privileges that relate to the body and spirit of a
human being) and property rights (personal rights and privileges that relate to physical
things). See generally Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 1 introductory note (1936). With respect to nonproperty rights, the state limits rights of selective association when it effectively destroys the
financial viability of certain single sex clubs through the licensing process. See New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). The state limits rights of
personal expression when it prohibits by legislation the defacement of the American flag.
See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). In the case of liquor licensing, the erosion
of these nonproperty rights is a consequence of political activity within or directed at the
state's administrative function. In the case of flag legislation, the erosion of these rights is
a consequence of political activity operating within or directed at the state's legislative
function. With respect to the limitation of property rights, it is now settled that property
rights are a category of personal rights, ownership being merely a collection of personal
rights relating to a tangible or intangible thing. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 1
introductory note (1936). Through the enactment of rent control ordinances, the state
limits the property right of the landlord to maximize the economic return on real estate
and bestows on the tenant a right to occupy someone else's real estate at a cost that is
below market. Through flag defacement legislation, the state attempts to limit property
rights, in this case a person's use of his flag.
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ogy. Karl Marx, for example, considered ideology to be "[t]he phenomenon of collective thinking, which proceeds according to
interests and social and existential situations,"24 hardly a working
definition. Be that as it may, the purpose of an ideology in the
political context is to articulate political objectives and provide a
rationale and justification for the pursuit of those objectives.25
In the context of trust administration-insofar as the official actions of a trustee are concerned--moral behavior should be defined
simply as behavior that is not prohibited by law and is in accord
with the settlor's express or implied wishes.26 In the context of
24. See K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 124 (L. Wirth & E. Shils trans.
Harvest Book ed. 1936).
25. Karl Mannheim, for example, attributed what he considered the "historical conservatism" of Edmund Burke to an ideology intended to rationalize and justify the political objective of keeping the reins of state in the hands of the aristocratic class of late
eighteenth century Germany and England. Id. at 120. At the core of the ideology is the
notion that there is a 'ye ne sais quoi element in politics [that] can be acquired only
through long experience and reveals itself as a rule only to those who for many generations have shared in political leadership." Id.
With respect to late eighteenth century North America, it might be said that the political objective of the Framers of the United States Constitution was to erode the power
and authority of the constituent states. See THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1-5 (A. Hamilton) (Johns Hopkins 2d ed. 1981). The ideological rationale and justification for the ratification was to secure the safety and liberty of the free citizens of the constituent states.
Id.
Capitalism, it might be said, is an ideology that rationalizes and justifies the state's use
or threatened use of its instruments of economic and physical coercion to maintain conditions that permit the unequal distribution of property among individuals. It also articulates the means of maintaining those conditions. See, e.g., 1 A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 129 (Everyman's Library ed. 1977). Socialism, on the other hand, is an ideology that rationalizes and justifies the political objective of causing the state to use or
threaten to use its instruments of economic and physical coercion to limit the property
rights of individuals. It also articulates the means of achieving that limitation. See generally THE DEFENSE OF GRACCHUS BABEUF 54 (Scott trans. Schocken Paperback ed.
1972).
26. For a trustee to adopt any other standard of morality would be arbitrary and
capricious. Whose moral code other than that of society, as reflected in the law, and the
trust settlor, to the extent that it reasonably can be ascertained, should guide the trustee
in the administration of the trust? The moral code of a board of trustees or an interest
group, as a practical matter, is not susceptible of divination. To be sure, one can imagine
situations in which the application of this legalistic and mechanical standard could lead
to consequences that, in the minds of some, are morally offensive. A trustee, for example,
could not, under this standard, invest trust assets in a profitable shipment of proven but
unlicensed anticancer miracle drugs, but could invest in a profitable shipment of cigarettes.
Whether to "capitalize" or "decapitalize" South Africa in order to end state-sponsored
racial segregation is an issue of political strategy and tactics. Surely, honorable people
who embrace an ideology that rationalizes and justifies the political objective of ending
state-sponsored racial segregation can disagree on whether the means should be evolutionary or revolutionary.
It would seem inappropriate to call upon a trustee, in his official capacity, to involve
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trust administration, engaging in unauthorized self-dealing and
failing to carry out the lawful purposes of the trust are perhaps the
only two actions which subject a trustee in his official capacity to
criticism based on moral considerations. 2" Therefore, it would be
perverse to subject a trustee to moral criticism because the trustee
declines to commit someone else's property to a political battle.
With these definitions in mind, the Article will discuss charitable
activity in depth.
Unfortunately, this Article cannot examine political exploitation
of all types of trusts. Since the perspective of this Article is that of
the settlor, exploitation of pension trusts for political purposes is
not discussed.2" Additionally, the use of irrevocable personal trust
property for political purposes is not discussed since social investhimself in a political controversy over matters such as the regulation of tobacco products
and the strategy and tactics of fighting state-sponsored racial segregation. The halls of a
trust department are not a proper arena for political battle over such public policy issues.
27. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS
1278 (7th ed. 1988) [hereinafter RiTCHIE, ALFORD & EFFLAND].
28. Under classic principles of trust law, it is not always clear whether the settlor of a
pension trust is the employer or the employee.
In a defined benefit [pension] plan, the benefits to be received by the employee
on retirement are specified in advance. The employer is responsible for paying
these benefits, and the purpose of the pension trust fund is to assure that the
employer has the assets to pay them in full even if the income from his business
is insufficient. In a defined contribution plan, the employee on retirement receives an amount determined by his own and his employer's contributions plus
accumulated income and appreciation on these contributions; he is not entitled
to an amount specified in advance.
Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 75 n. 12.
Thus, as a matter of state property law, it is not always clear, particularly with respect
to property allocable to the employer's contributions to a defined benefit pension trust,
who would qualify as the trust settlor. Because this article focuses on the speech and
associational rights of trust settlors, the author feels that the use of pension trust funds
for political purposes ought to be the subject of a separate article.
With respect to private pension trusts, it should be noted that the Department of Labor
apparently opposes sacrificing investment performance to advance the social welfare of a
group or region. Knickerbocker, Trust Law with a Difference: An Overview of ERISA
FiduciaryResponsibility, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 633, 659 n.150 (1988). By implication, the Department of Labor, however, would not consider the mixing of politics
and pensions to be imprudent per se. A trustee who, with the state's sanction, socially
invests public pension funds may be even less vulnerable to attack by employees than a
private pension trustee because "taxpayers may be required to financially support governmental programs and messages to which they are ideologically opposed." Keller v. State
Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1181, 767 P.2d 1020, 1039, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 561 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990); see also Pension Funds
to Politicians:Hands Off, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 3 (discussing alleged political exploitation of public pension funds). The editors of the Wall Street Journal have
suggested that "pension funds are very likely to become the next great political honey
pot." Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1989, at A14, col. 2.
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ing advocates have focused little attention on such trusts.29
Whether a trustee may exploit the property of any type of noncharitable trust for purposes traditionally considered charitablewhich is to say, purposes that fall within the spirit of the Statute of
Charitable Uses 3 -also falls outside the concerns of this Article.
Finally, the Article forgoes examining the legal issues that arise
when a trustee's practice of social investing causes economic injury
to a trust. Others have investigated that aspect of the practice. 3 1
29. But see Boston Herald, Sept. 15, 1987, at 4, col. 1 (reporting that Michael S.
Dukakis, the 1988 Democratic Presidential candidate and cotrustee with a bank of an
irrevocable personal trust established by his late father, was criticized by some for acquiescing in the bank's investment of the trust property in companies that were doing business in South Africa).
30. "A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959). A charitable trust is valid
although it is to continue beyond the period of the rule against perpetuities. 4A W.
FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 365.
It is impossible to enumerate all the purposes that have been held by the
courts to be charitable purposes or that may hereafter be held to be charitable
purposes. Certain purposes are clearly charitable.... In addition to these purposes there must be added a more general and indefinite category, a general
catchall, to include the vast number of miscellaneous purposes that are properly
held to be charitable.. Perhaps these can best be included under the heading of
other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community.
Id. § 368.
In 1601, shortly before the death of Queen Elizabeth, Parliament enacted the
famous statute known as the Statute of Charitable Uses [or the Statute of Elizabeth, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601)]. This statute provided that the chancellor might
from time to time award commissions to the bishop of every diocese and to
other persons, authorizing them to inquire into abuses and breaches of trust
where property is given for charitable purposes, and to make such orders, judgments, and decrees as should be necessary to carry out the purposes for which
the donors had given the property, and which should be valid until altered by
the chancellor. The statute thus provided machinery for the enforcement of
charitable trusts. The importance of the statute, however, lies not in the procedure thus authorized, for it appears after a time to have been little employed,
but in the provisions of the preamble of the statute, which contains an enumeration of charitable purposes .... This enumeration is not and clearly was not
intended to be exhaustive. It merely gives typical instances of purposes that are
charitable. The courts, both in England and the United States, have frequently
had recourse to the statute as showing the kind of purpose that is charitable.
Id. § 368.1; see also infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
31. Some data suggests that a trust fund runs an increased risk of sustaining economic injury when political considerations enter into the investment management process. For example, the transactional costs directly attributable to the divestment of the
New Jersey State employee pension fund of holdings in companies doing business in
South Africa are conservatively estimated to be $824,000 as of August 27, 1988. See
STATE INVESTMENT COUNCIL, N.J. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1988, at 45 (1988); see also Martin,
supra note 4, at 299 (estimating that divestment could reduce Columbia University's re-
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With these limitations in mind, the discussion now turns to the
history of IOLTA and social investing.
II.

HISTORY OF

A.

IOLTA AND SOCIAL INVESTING

History of IOLTA

32

In the United States, clients sometimes will entrust funds to
their lawyers. A lawyer may, for example, temporarily hold an
insurance company's personal injury settlement disbursement or
an alimony payment. Ordinarily, the lawyer, as trustee, has a duty
to invest the funds for the client's benefit with all net investment
income accruing to the client.33 Historically, however, "nominal"
sums held in trust and sums to be held for only a short period were
not subject to this general rule. 34 Because it was considered administratively impractical and economically counterproductive to
put these sums to work, generally accepted practice in the United
States allowed lawyers to deposit these funds in bank accounts
bearing no interest. Any economic benefit resulting from the use of
these funds accrued to the banks' shareholders.35
In the late 1970s, however, things changed when other states,
following Florida's lead, 36 began either to allow or to require lawyer-trustees to pool nominal and short-term client funds and disburse the income generated by these pools to certain institutions
whose purposes were characterized as charitable. These purposes
often involve subsidizing legal representation and advocacy in civil
matters or sponsoring law reform projects. 7 IOLTA is the term
turn on equity by nearly $5 million annually, or roughly half the university's 1986-87
tuition increase); Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 76-96 ("[c]onclud[ing] that the
usual forms of social investing involve a combination of reduced diversification and
higher administrative costs not offset by net consumption gains to the investment
beneficiaries").
32. See generally Comment, IOLTA - Overcoming its Current Obstacles, 18
STETSON L. REV. 415 (1989).
33. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983).
34. See Comment, supra note 32, at 415.
35. At least one court has noted, however, that "[p]resent technology makes ...

calculations [of interest accruing on nominal or short-term investments] simple and inexpensive." In re Ind. State Bar Ass'n Petition to Authorize a Program Governing Interest
on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ind. 1990) [hereinafter Indiana State
Bar Petition]. Thus, an attorney easily could subaccount each client's funds and credit
accrued interest to the client. "This, of course, is where that interest money belongs and
it is the duty of the lawyer and the legal profession to see to it that the client gets it if
possible and practical." Id.
36. Comment, supra note 32.
37. Alan Rogers, Director of the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, confirmed
that the Institute uses IOLTA funds to sponsor housing and health-care legislation. Tele-

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

used to describe these state-authorized or state-mandated programs that exploit the income from pools of client funds for ostensibly charitable purposes. 38 By December 1989, forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia had implemented IOLTA programs.39 Since their inception, these programs have generated an
aggregate $261,865,322.00 for IOLTA recipients.4
In the 1980s, the possibility that the Internal Revenue Service
might apply the assignment of income doctrine to the diversion of
IOLTA pool income troubled proponents of the programs. 41 Insertion in IOLTA programs of a requirement that clients have no
control over selection of IOLTA income recipients appears to have
laid IRS concerns to rest.42 Proponents also faced the possibility
that a client successfully would challenge the income diversion as
an unconstitutional taking of the client's beneficial interest in the
trust property.43 Fifth and fourteenth amendment constitutional
challenges to IOLTA, however, have not succeeded. The courts to
phone interview with Alan Rogers (Dec. 1, 1989) (conducted by research assistant Lynn
O'Brien). The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, an organization with close ties
to the District of Columbia Bar, studies the broad problems of homelessness, proposes
municipal legislation, and engages in legal advocacy. The Clinic supplements monies
received from an annual basketball game between members of Congress and Georgetown
Law Center faculty with IOLTA funds and other grants. See Bates, Attorneys Attack
Homelessness, MASS. L. MONTHLY, Jan. 1990, at 4.

38. As of December 1989, only five states - California, Connecticut, Maryland, New
York, and Pennsylvania - were operating IOLTA programs under legislative authority.
All other programs were operating by judicial fiat. Seven states compelled attorneys,
under threat of disbarment, to use IOLTA accounts. These mandatory IOLTA programs
are euphemistically called "comprehensive." ABA/IOLTA Clearinghouse, IOLTA Program Profiles (based on figures available December 1989) (copy on file with author).
Participation in Florida's program became mandatory on October 1, 1989, pursuant to
a new Florida Supreme Court rule. A state representative immediately thereafter introduced a bill that would require a client to specify permissible uses of income generated by
his funds. The bill's sponsor argued that use of the income "for free legal aid to sue
someone whose money generated the interest in the first place ... should be the client's
prerogative." UPI report (March 11, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current 1988-file).
39. ABA/IOLTA Clearinghouse, IOLTA Program Profiles (based on figures available December 1989) (copy on file with author). Indiana steadfastly has refused to adopt
an IOLTA program, reasoning that such a program violates ethical standards. See Indiana State Bar Petition, supra note 35. West Virginia is the only other state without an
IOLTA program. Brennecke, A Look Back, IOLTA UPDATE, Vol. 6, No. 2, at 1 (1989).
40. ABA/IOLTA Clearinghouse, IOLTA Program Profiles (based on figures available December 1989) (copy on file with author).
41. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16; see also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15
(1930) (income is taxable to the person who earned it regardless of any anticipatory arrangement which prevents the income from vesting in that person).
42. See Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16; cf Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-022 (Dec. 27,
1989) (interest is taxable to client where program allows deposit election by client and
requires recoupment in the event generated interest exceeds a specified amount).
43. See Comment, supra note 32, at 425.
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date have declined to find that a client reasonably may expect to
earn income on a nominal or short-term sum held in a client trust
account." The United States Supreme Court, however, never has
ruled upon the taking issue, twice declining to review lower court
decisions adverse to clients. 5
Currently IOLTA thrives. Well-staffed, committed bureaucracies propagandize on behalf of the IOLTA concept and foster a
public perception that IOLTA's legal status is a settled matter.
Some IOLTA income, however, is being used for political rather
than charitable purposes. Reexamination of the IOLTA concept,
therefore, is warranted because uses in furtherance of a political
objective may abridge a client's first and fourteenth amendment
rights of speech and political association in judicially cognizable
ways.
B.

History of Social Investing

Professor Schotland noted in 1980 that social investing raises the
"more-heat-than-light issue[ ] . . . of whether pension [trust] funds
should diverge from their traditional goal of maximizing investment return at an appropriate level of risk in order to pursue other
goals." 46 In his view, control of the semantic high ground is an
object of the battle.47 He argued that the label "social" is too
broad and thus impedes analysis. 4s He concluded that "alternative" or "divergent" is a more accurate label for this type of investing.4 9 Professor Schotland cited as the earliest explicit advocacy of
44. Clients who have challenged IOLTA programs in the courts have argued that
such programs constitute a taking of property in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Such arguments generally have been rejected because courts have declined
to find that a client legitimately could expect that earnings would accrue on nominal
amounts held in trust by his or her attorney. See Cone v. State Bar, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 917 (1987); Carroll v. State Bar, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 213
Cal. Rptr. 305 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985).
45. Cone, 487 U.S. 917 (1987); Carroll, 474 U.S. 848 (1985).
46. Schotland, Should Pension FundsBe Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?, TR. & EST.,
Sept. 1980, at 10.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Professor Schotland wrote:
Analysis suffers from the outset if the label "social" or "socially responsible"
investing is accepted. Few minds will be open to any plea for the anti-social or
irresponsible, and hardly any more will think "let the market decide" a sufficient answer. But further, the "social" label is over-broad. Everyone agrees
that investing for retirement security itself is a socially responsible goal. More
accurate labels would be "alternative" or "divergent" investing, since the proposal is to tap pension assets for goals other than retirement security.
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"divergent" investing a 1931 Wisconsin legislative proposal that
the state teachers' retirement fund should favor investment in Wisconsin farm mortgages. 50 Recently, the social investment movement exerted enormous pressure on university trustees to "divest"
endowment trusts of companies doing business in South Africa.5 '
A wide range of interest groups, movements, and causes, including some that espouse ideologies that do not articulate political
objectives, have found that the practice of social investing is an
effective instrument of communication. 2 Special purpose mutual
funds have emerged to service individuals who wish to socially invest their own funds.53 The amount of entrusted and nonentrusted
property being socially invested is estimated to exceed $400
billion. 4
The standards determining which entities will be social investment targets seem arbitrary unless ideology and politics are taken
into account. For example, why is a manufacturing concern on a
target list, but its bank and suppliers are not? Why is it acceptable
to consume the concern's products, but not to invest in the concern
itself? Why do social investors demonize one oppressive regime
but ignore another equally oppressive regime? These inconsistencies grow out of political and ideological motivations.5
50. Id. at 11.
51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
52. When determining whether or not to invest in a particular company, social investors frequently use the following criteria: (1) equal employment opportunity, particularly
for women and minorities; (2) treatment of employees with respect to safety and health,
participatory management, fair labor practices, or pay and benefits; (3) environmental
protection; (4) consumer protection and product purity; (5) innovation and quality-of-life
enhancing technologies, products, or services; (6) involvement with nuclear power; (7)
defense contracts and weapons development; (8) business with repressive regimes, notably South Africa; (9) charity; (10) alcohol, gambling, or tobacco; (11) special economic or
social contributions to the community; (12) miscellaneous, e.g., draining capital from the
United States. Rockness & Williams, A Descriptive Study of Social Responsibility Mutual
Funds, 13 ACCT. ORGANIZATIONS & Soc'Y 397, 401 (1988); see generally Putting Your
Money Where Your Politics Are: Is the Left Ready to Do Business?, SOcIALIST REV.,
Spring 1987, at 65.
53. Schlesinger, Investing Based on Social Issues Is Gaining Adherents Among the
Children of the '60s, Wall St. J., July 11, 1984, at 33, col. 4.
54. Niederman, Second Thoughts About Ethical Investing, INVESTMENT VISION,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 13.
55. See Baldwin, Morality Plays, FORBES, July 29, 1985, at 42; Rothchild, Clean
Money, NEW ENGLAND MONTHLY, Feb. 1986, at 56.
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THE REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST WITH A Focus ON

IOLTA
A.

How Does IOL TA Fit into the Framework of Trust Law?

A lawyer who participates in a state-sanctioned or state-compelled IOLTA program commingles the assets of revocable living
trusts established on a temporary basis by clients. The lawyer is
the trustee of these trusts. Each client is settlor, beneficiary, and
remainderman of his trust.56 The client reserves the right to revoke
the trust, a right in the nature of a general inter vivos power of
appointment.5
In most IOLTA programs, the IRS finds no nexus between the
client and the portion of the IOLTA income stream attributable to
the client's monies. Thus, temporary availability of the client's
property for IOLTA income generation imposes no income tax
consequences on the client."' As a matter of state property law,
however, the fact that trust property produces no taxable income
in no way affects possession of a beneficial interest in the property. 9 If, for example, unproductive land replaced an income-producing stock portfolio as the trust res, the trust beneficiaries would
not lose their beneficial interest in the trust to the trustee or to
third parties merely because the trust property ceased producing
income.' The beneficial interest thereafter might consist of the
right to enter upon the land and the right to evict third parties.
Courts considering IOLTA programs essentially have ignored or
rejected the longstanding principle of state property law that such
beneficial interests constitute property. If there is no property,
then there is nothing for the state to take.6 ' Courts also have found
that allocation of IOLTA pool income to entities other than the
client class does not constitute a levy and appropriation of tax
monies by the state. 62 If such an allocation were a legitimate exer56. See Comment, supra note 32, at 432; 1 W. FRATCHER, supra note 23, §§ 12.2,
12.6 (1987).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.4(1) (1986). "A power of appointment is general if it is exercisable in favor of any one or more of the following: the
donee of the power, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate or the creditors of the donee's estate." Id. In the case of a sum belonging to a client that is held in trust by the
attorney, the client is both the settlor of the trust and the donee of the general inter vivos
power of appointment.
58. See Comment, supra note 32, at 425.
59. 3A W. FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 240 (1988).
60. See 2A id. §§ 175, 181 (1987).
61. See Comment, supra note 32, at 425-26.
62. See, e.g., Carroll v. State Bar, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1207, 213 Cal. Rptr. 305,
313 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985).
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cise of the state's power to tax, then an IOLTA program's use of
the client-settlor's beneficial interest for political purposes would
not be an issue since appropriation of tax monies for political purposes is constitutional.6 a
B. Are the Purposes of IOLTA Political?
Proponents of IOLTA consistently define its objectives as charitable."r That characterization should not go unchallenged. The determination that an activity is either charitable or political often
seems subjective. Two decisions involving trusts for the support of
newspapers illustrate the reality that one person's charity is another person's politics. 65 In re Strakosch,66 a 1949 English case,
involved a trust created to ameliorate South Africa's racial
problems. That trust was held noncharitable because it was established to strengthen the bonds of unity between South Africa and
the mother country, and to reduce racial tension between the
Dutch and English-speaking segments of South Africa.67 Lord
Greene justified the court's decision by noting that appeasement of
racial feeling in a community is a political problem. He suggested
that a newspaper which supports such an objective is a political
69
instrument.68 Strakosch stands in contrast to Jackson v. Phillips,
an 1867 Massachusetts case. In that decision, the court implicitly
confirmed that a trust established to prepare and circulate abolitionist newspapers was charitable in nature.7 °
Some commentators suggest that charitable activity and political
activity are essentially the same. They offer two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, judicial characterization of an activ63. See Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542
(1989), rev'd on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
64. See Comment, supra note 32, at 441.
65. See, e.g., Jackson, Cranston's Use of Voter-Registration Charitiesto Benefit Campaign Highlights Gray Legal Area, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
66. 2 All E.R. 6 (1949).
67. Id. at 7.
68. Lord Greene wrote for the court:
The problem of appeasing racial feeling within the community is a political
problem, perhaps primarily political. One method conducive to its solution
might well be to support a political party or a newspaper which had such appeasement most at heart. This argument gains force in the present case from
the other political object, namely, the strengthening of the bonds of unity between the Union and the mother country. It would also we think be easy to
think of arrangements for mutual hospitality which would be conducive to the
purposes set out but would not be charitable.
Id. at 9.
69. 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
70. Id. at 541.
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ity as charitable is a political act. Second, the overseer of public
charities, usually an attorney general, is a politician with
prosecutorial and enforcement discretion.71 Despite state involvement in the regulation of both political and charitable activities,
the two are not the same because their purposes are different.
Political activity attempts to influence the exercise of state power.
Legitimate charitable activity does not. In the context of donative
transfers, charitable activity is associated with the private, voluntary transfer of property for the benefit of the community at large.
By way of illustration, a Republican or Democrat might say in all
sincerity that a voluntary donative transfer of $1000 in trust for the
benefit of his party also benefits the community at large. Each,
however, would agree that such a transfer is a political and not a
charitable contribution because the transfer clearly is intended to
influence the exercise of state power.
The best source of guidance for determining whether a particular trust activity is charitable remains the catalogue of uses set
forth in the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses.72 The enumerated charitable uses include relief for the poor, maintenance of
schools, and support for government projects such as the repair of
bridges, ports, and roads.73 Inherent in the spirit of the preamble is
the notion that a trust created for the conduct of political activity
is not a charitable trust.74
Determining what constitutes political activity in the context of
the Statute of Charitable Uses has always been difficult." The test
appears to be whether the activity relates in some way to the exercise of state power. When a trust provides shelter for a homeless
person, for example, it engages in charitable activity. But when the
trust hires a lobbyist to persuade a city councilor to support a rent
control ordinance, it engages in political activity.
71. See generally Note, Charity and Politics, 10 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 169 (1982) (discussing
the law of charities and its political underpinnings).
72. 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601).
73. The charitable uses listed in the preamble are:
Reliefe of aged impotent and poore people, . . . Maintenance of sicke and
maymed Souldiers and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and
Schollers in Univsities, . . . Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies
Churches Seabankes and Highwaies ... Educacon and pfermente of Orphans
...Reliefe Stocke or Maintenance for Howses of Correcon ... Mariages of
poore Maides . . . Supportacon Ayde and Helpe of younge Tradesmen,
Handiecraftesmen and psons decayed.... reliefe or redemption of Prisoners or
Captives, and for aide or ease of any poore Inhabitants....
Id.
74. See 4A W. FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 374.6 (1989).
75. Id.
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A trust that funds the dissemination of information on homelessness may fall into the gray area between these extremes. The absence of an objective and workable definition of education makes
characterizing such activity difficult. Such a definition would distinguish the motives and objectives of the lobbyists and the propagandists from those of the educators working in "schooles of
learninge" 76 contemplated by the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses. Each presumably considers his activity beneficial to the
community as a whole. The lobbyist and the propagandist, however, attempt to influence with words the state's use of its instruments of economic and physical coercion. The educator does not.
Many IOLTA grants subsidize legal representation and advocacy in civil matters or sponsor law reform projects. Activity such
as civil legal representation and advocacy, intended to stimulate
and influence the state's adjudicative function, is political activity
because the judicial function itself is intimately involved with the
exercise of state power. The judiciary exists in part to effect the
state's orderly limitation of certain rights and privileges of one or
more parties to a dispute." It legislates when disposing of cases,
because no two cases have all the same facts. 78 Moreover, the judiciary has at its disposal the state's instruments of economic and
physical coercion.
An IOLTA grant fueling litigation by a tenant group against a
landlord exemplifies a use for political purposes. That grant could
result in the temporary use of the landlord's own property, perhaps
in the form of a nominal sum held in an IOLTA account, to help
bring about, for good or for ill, a limitation of the landlord's property rights and privileges. Such use also might infringe on the
landlord's political rights of expression and association, an injury
that should not be discounted or ignored merely because the value
79
of the IOLTA trust property allocable to the landlord is nominal.
Likewise, if a "law reform project" relates to the potential limitation of someone's personal rights and privileges, then, to borrow a
term from the Internal Revenue Service, that project is a political
76. See Sheridan, Charity Versus Politics, 2 ANGLo-AM. L. REV. 47 (1973).
77. See J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 23, at 4.
78. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. went so far as to suggest that "[t]he felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed." 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see generally M. COHEN,
supra note 23, at 122.
79. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1976); see also infra text accompanying notes 111-13.
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"action" activity.80 On the other hand, an IOLTA income grant to
improve the physical facilities of a court system is not a use for
political purposes. Such a use would fit comfortably within the
charitable spirit of the "bridge repair" section in the preamble to
the Statute of Charitable Uses."'
C.

Under Current Law, May the Attorney-Trustee Use IOLTA
Fundsfor PoliticalPurposes?

A lawyer in possession of funds belonging to a client is a trustee
of those funds and not merely a bailee or a debtor of the client.,2
The lawyer, functioning as a trustee, has a fiduciary duty under
trust law principles to disclose fully to the client-beneficiary the
potential uses of the trust property. 3 As a lawyer, he or she also
has an affirmative duty of disclosure under the Rules of Professional Responsibility. 4
Despite the transfer of title to the lawyer-trustee, the client typically reserves a general inter vivos power of appointment over the
funds. The client thus possesses the lesser inherent power to direct

the trustee to keep the funds uninvested."5 Therefore, under classic
80. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 733.121-.122 (1990); see also supra note 35 and accompanying
text; Sabbath, Tax Exempt Political EducationalOrganizations: Is the Exemption Being
Abused?, 41 TAX LAW, 847 (1988) (explaining that the IRS defines a noncharitable political action organization as one that either attempts to influence legislation by propaganda
or otherwise, or participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political
campaign).
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImILITY DR 9-102 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983); 1 W. FRATCHER, supra note 23,

§ 2.
83. "The trustee is under a duty to... beneficiaries to give them on their request at
reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the administration of the
trust." See 2A W. FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 173 (1987).
84. With respect to a lawyer's duty to disclose information to his client, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983); but see
Indiana State Bar Petition, supra note 35, at 314 (indicating that, "[i]ncredibly, courts
adopting IOLTA programs have... provided that once an attorney decides to participate
in an IOLTA program it is not necessary to inform his client").
85. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state:
Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(b) (1983); cf In re Estate of
Walbridge, 138 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sur. Ct. 1955) (where testator granted life beneficiary a
testamentary power of appointment over the trust remainder, and the donee-beneficiary
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principles of trust law, the attorney-trustee would be in breach of
trust upon his failure to honor any direction that constitutes a partial exercise of the client's reserved general inter vivos power of
appointment.
Moreover, without full and fair advance disclosure of the political uses of IOLTA income, and in the face of the substantial state
action involved in establishing and administering the IOLTA system, such political use might interfere with the client-beneficiary's
first amendment speech and associational rights.86 While courts
consistently have rejected arguments that the administration of an
IOLTA program represents an unconstitutional taking by the state
of a client's property, no case has attacked an IOLTA program on
the grounds of unconstitutional interference with the client's first
amendment rights of free speech and political association.
IV.

A.

THE IRREVOCABLE CHARITABLE TRUST WITH A
ON SOCIAL INVESTING

Focus

What Is Social Investing and How Does It Fit into the
Framework of the Law of Trusts?

In the context of trust administration, a trustee engages in social
investing when he applies criteria not related to the trust's economic welfare or administration in making investment decisions.
Professors Langbein and Posner define social investing in general
terms as the "pursuit of an investment strategy that tempers the
conventional objective of maximizing the investor's financial interests by seeking to promote nonfinancial social goals as well."" 7 The
advocates of social investment seek a modification of the fundamental rule of trust administration that the trustee must act solely
in the beneficiaries' interests. The practitioner of social investing
considers the interests of certain other groups along with those of
the beneficiaries. 8 Which groups are eligible and to what extent
their interests may be considered remain open legal questions.
exercised that power by creating a trust for her sons, but required in her will that the
trust corpus be invested and reinvested in accordance with state banking laws, the doneebeneficiary's will governed the investment powers of the trustee of the sons' trusts, despite
the fact that the original testator's will authorized investment in nonlegals). See generally
1 W. FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 17.2 (1989).
86. For a discussion of the constitutional dimensions of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 109-15.
87. Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 73.
88. See id. at 96-107.
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B. Are the Purposes of Social Investing Political?
Social investment movements acquire a political orientation
when they attempt to attain their goals by enlisting the power of
the state. For example, elements of the antiapartheid movement
currently lobby for legislation limiting the rights of United States
citizens to conduct business in South Africa. These lobbyists also
seek modification of American foreign policy regarding South Africa. 89 Similarly, members of the peace movement advocate state
closure of nuclear weapons production facilities. 90 The rhetoric of
the debates may be laced with references to moral considerations,
but ultimately the goal, whether for good or ill, is to make someone, be it the entrepreneur or the shareholder in a nuclear weapons
company, the object of a state's instruments of coercion.
Social investing theoretically may be apolitical. Investments
made by a trust fiduciary for the purpose of furthering the fiduciary's own political agenda constitute only one form of social investing. A trustee engages in apolitical social investing, for example,
when he, with much fanfare, eliminates tobacco stocks from a
89. "[T]he major groups [of the U.S. antiapartheid lobby] are working specifically on
public education on South African issues, lobbying Congress for more thorough bans on
commerce with and investment in South Africa ....
." Howard, Lobbying Against
Apartheid, AFR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 40. "[T]he South African issue was understood from the beginning as American racial politics as much as foreign policy." Martin,
supra note 4, at 293.
90. Political activist Leon Wofsy stated: "As a peace activist, I work with others as hard as all of us can - to overcome the policies and mentality of the Cold War. We
seek to commit our government to joint action with the Soviet Union to stop testing and
building nuclear weapons ... ." Survival In the Nuclear Age: An Interview with Leon
Wofsy, MONTHLY REV., June 1987, at 41. One author described the causal link between
movements and policy: "Coalition movements... cause people to act on their opinions,
and they cause these opinions to be seen as important. This, in turn, influences policy
when conditions are right in the political structure." Everts, Where the Peace Movement
Goes When It Disappears, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTIsTs, Nov. 1989, at 28.
The United States Supreme Court most recently addressed issues related to political
advocacy in another context in Keller v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990). There the
Court noted:
Precisely where the line falls between those State Bar activities in which the
officials and members of the Bar are acting essentially as professional advisors
to those ultimately charged with the regulation of the legal profession, on the
one hand, and those activities having political or ideological coloration which
are not reasonably related to the advancement of such goals, on the other, will
not always be easy to discern. But the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear:
Compulsory dues may not be expended to endorse or advance a gun control or
nuclear weapons freeze initiative; at the other end of the spectrum petitioners
have no valid constitutional objection to their compulsory dues being spent for
activities connected with disciplining members of the bar or proposing ethical
codes for the profession.
Id. at 2237.
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trust's portfolio in order to publicize a voluntary private boycott of
cigarette products. Of course, most real world ideological objectives will not fall neatly into either the political or the apolitical
category. Almost any act can trigger a chain of events ultimately
resulting in some state response. A boycott, for example, may lead
to a statutory ban on the sale of tobacco products. 91 Whether a
trustee may engage in apolitical social investing of trust funds and
whether that would compromise a settlor's speech and associational rights must be the subject of another article.
C.

Under Current Law, May a Trustee Use Charitable Trust
Fundsfor PoliticalPurposes?

A settlor who authorizes a trustee to engage in political activity
with trust property ought to be estopped from objecting to such
activity. In the absence of such express or implied authorization,
however, the issue is whether a trustee may use trust property to
further his own political agenda. The answer depends on whether,
by operation of law, the settlor retains any rights over the trust
property. If so, do such rights include the right not to have the
settlor's property used for political purposes? Where state action is
involved, as in the case of an IOLTA program, abridgement of first
amendment rights of free speech and political association may occur. 92 Where state action arguably is absent, as in the case of 93
a
lie.
may
liability
tort
private
trust,
endowment
university
private
1. Does the Settlor of an Irrevocable Trust Who Is Not a
Beneficiary and Who Retains No Powers of
Appointment or Administration Retain Any
Right to Compel the Trustee to
Carry Out the Terms of the Trust?
When a settlor reserves a beneficial interest in trust property, as
is the case with a nominal amount temporarily entrusted to an attorney under an IOLTA trust arrangement, the settlor in his ca91. See Deveney & Bacon, Tobacco Is FacingNew Attacks, Wall St. J., May 24, 1990,
at 1, col. 6 (reporting that "Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan is planning to recommend curbs on the [tobacco] industry as part of a stepped-up campaign
against smoking").
92. See Keller v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1976).
93. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 865 (1979) (stating that "[o]ne who by
a consciously wrongful act intentionally deprives another of a right to vote in a public
election or to hold public office or who seriously interferes with either of these rights is
subject to liability to the other").
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pacity as a beneficiary has a right to compel enforcement. 94 When
the settlor does not expressly retain an interest in or power over the
trust property, however, it has been assumed dogmatically that
neither the settlor nor the settlor's representatives can compel performance of the trust or redress a breach. 95 This position, howV
ever, finds little judicial authority. The position, at first glance,
appears to take support from the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
which provides that neither a settlor nor his heirs can enforce the
trust or remedy a breach unless the settlor retained an interest in
the trust property. 96 Upon reflection, however, one realizes that
although this section might apply to the settlor of a trust with a
general charitable purpose, it does not apply to the settlor of either
a noncharitable personal trust or a trust with a limited charitable
purpose. 9 The settlor of a personal or limited charitable purpose
trust retains a vested reversionary interest in the trust property.
The reversionary interest exists because of the possibility that the
trust may fail at some future time for want of a purpose or beneficiary. 98 Upon the failure of the trust, a resulting trust would arise in
favor of the settlor or the settlor's estate. 99 Thus, the Restatement
94. See RrrCHIE, ALFORD & EFFLAND, supra note 27, at 1335.
95. See Note, supra note 19, at 1370-71.
96. The pertinent section of the Restatement provides:
Neither the settlor nor his heirs or personal representatives, as such, can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce a trust or to enjoin or obtain redress for
a breach of trust. Where, however, the settlor retains an interest in the trust
property, he can of course maintain a suit against the trustee to protect that
interest. Thus, if the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, or if he has an
interest by way of resulting trust, or if he has reserved power to revoke the trust,
he can maintain a suit against the trustee to protect his interest.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 comment b (1959).
97. The Massachusetts Supreme Court defined the doctrine of cy pres in terms of an
alternative to the resulting trust:
[W]hen a gift is made to trustees for a charitable purpose, the general nature of
which is pointed out, and which is lawful and valid at the time of the death of
the [settlor], and no intention is expressed to limit it to a particular institution
or mode of application, and afterwards, either by change of circumstances the
scheme of the [settlor] becomes impracticable, or by change of law becomes
illegal, the fund, having once vested in the charity, does not go to the heirs at
law as a resulting trust, (as would be the case with a noncharitable personal
trust or a charitable trust with a limited charitable purpose], but is to be applied
by the court of chancery, in the exercise of its jurisdiction in equity, as near the
[settlor's] particular directions as possible to carry out his general charitable
intent.
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 580 (1867).
98. See J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 34, 41.1, 113, 113.1, 113.3,
327.1 (4th ed. 1942).
99. See National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 462-69, 53 N.E.2d 113, 11721 (1944).
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suggests that a reversionary interest in trust property gives many
settlors sufficient standing to compel trustees to carry out the provisions of their trusts.
A note in the 1949 Harvard Law Review took a different approach to support the proposition that a settlor retains some right
of enforcement against the trustee.'°o That note analogized the status of the nonbeneficiary-settlor to that of a promisee under a
third-party beneficiary contract.'' The note suggested, in view of
the courts' equitable enforcement of third-party beneficiary contracts, that preventing serious abuses of the trust system required a
reappraisal of the settlor's remedial rights. 0 2 The reference to
abuse of the trust system apparently reflected a concern that trustees and beneficiaries, or trustees and attorneys general, may con0 3
spire to subvert settlors' legitimate express or implied intentions.
Professor Gaubatz picked up this theme when he suggested that
a settlor has, or ought to have, an "expectation interest" in the
trustee's compliance with the express and implied terms of the
trust. lo' This interest arises out of the promise made by the trustee
upon accepting the trust. According to Professor Gaubatz, if the
trustee's act is such that the settlor would not have established the
trust had he known what would transpire, then the settlor may
attack the trustee's action "regardless of a continued economic interest in the trust."' 0 5
2.

Are Any Expectation Interests of a Settlor Harmed if the
Trustee Uses Trust Property for Political Purposes?

Let us assume that Mrs. Smith, a vociferous advocate of either a
woman's right to choose an abortion or the unborn's right to life,
endowed the Smith Chair for the Study of Astrophysics at the Institute of High Technology with a large block of stock in her company. Essentially the endowment was accomplished when Mrs.
Smith, as settlor, transferred the stock in trust to the governing
100. Note, supra note 19, at 1377.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See RITCHIE, ALFORD & EFFLAND, supra note 27, at 651.
104. Gaubatz, supra note 22, at 921-24.
105. Gaubatz articulated the criterion for a settlor's possessing an expectation interest in the trust property:
[I]f the nature of the trustee's act is such that it is reasonable to assume that the
grantor would not have established the trust if he had known that the act would
occur, then the grantor has standing to litigate the trustee's action, regardless of
a continued economic interest in the trust.
Id. at 921-22.
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body of the Institute for the limited charitable purpose of furthering the study of astrophysics. Five years after the stock transfer,
the Institute's governing body, as trustee of the stock, began to
diversify the portfolio, ostensibly in accordance with the prudent
man rule.6 . The Institute also announced at a press conference its
intention to take a position on state regulation of abortion. Its position, however, was opposite to that of Mrs. Smith. The governing body would accomplish its purpose by investing or not
investing the trust corpus in companies that produce medical and
surgical devices used in abortion procedures. Before the announcement, no potential Institute benefactor reasonably could have expected that the governing body would exploit trust funds for
political purposes. Mrs. Smith, who holds her convictions
strongly, is enraged and seeks legal advice. Assuming the economic consequences of the trustee's social investment practices are
not susceptible of legal determination, 07 does Mrs. Smith, as settlor, have any recourse against the governing body, as trustee, for
making political statements with the trust property? The issue is
whether Mrs. Smith retained any protectable expectation interest
that would require the governing body, as trustee, to act apolitically in administering the trust.
If the Institute were a state agency, the social investment of the
trust assets might abridge Mrs. Smith's first amendment freedoms
of speech and of political association. A similar issue arose before
the United States Supreme Court in Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education. °8 That case involved the alleged use of dues by a public
employees' union for economic, political, professional, scientific,
and religious purposes. I0I Payment of dues to the union was a condition of employment. Plaintiffs objected to the use of their dues
for such purposes, claiming infringement of their right of political
association. Plaintiffs argued that they had a right not to associate1 ° that was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments."' The A bood Court agreed and held that a state may not
require an individual, as a condition of public employment, to relinquish rights guaranteed by the first amendment. It ordered the
106. The classic enunciation of the prudent man rule appears in Harvard College v.
Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1831).
107. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 92-94.
108. 431 U.S. 209 (1976).
109. Id. at 213.
110. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1352 (11th ed. 1985).
111. The penumbra of first amendment rights includes the right of nonpolitical association. Morgan v. Cox, No. 729 (Ohio App. April 11, 1981) (LEXIS, States library,
Ohio file) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)).
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union to remit to the employees that portion of their dues allocable
to the support of the union's political activity. The Court reasoned
that requiring employees to make contributions for political purposes works as great an infringement of their constitutional rights
as any prohibition against such contributions. 112 The Court noted
James Madison's observation that " 'the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever.' ""3 The Court also
cited Thomas Jefferson's warning that "'compel[ling] a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.' ""14
Turning back to Mrs. Smith's case, although taxpayers may be
compelled to support governmental programs that they oppose," 5
one would be hard pressed to find that Mrs. Smith's case falls into
that category. Thus, assuming some substantial state involvement
in the trust's administration, one reasonably could argue that Mrs.
Smith's first amendment speech and associational rights have been
abridged even more severely than those of the Abood plaintiffs.
The Abood plaintiffs at least had a choice-albeit a constitutionally
unacceptable one-regarding the political use of their money. The
abridgement was not absolute because they could have quit their
jobs. In contrast, unless Mrs. Smith has standing to vindicate her
expectation interest, the abridgement of her rights is absolute.
Mrs. Smith and her postmortem representatives can take no lawful
nonjudicial action which would prevent the trustee from exploiting
the trust property for political purposes.
In the absence of state involvement in the trust's administration,
the governing body of the Institute, as trustee, may be liable in tort.
This liability emanates in part from Mrs. Smith's common law
right to engage in political activity." 6 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts acknowledges the existence of a private civil wrong of inter112. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1976).
113. Id. at 234, 235 n.31 (quoting J. MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
186 (Hunt ed. 1901)).
114. Id. at 235 n.31; (quoting I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354
(1948)).
115. Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1181, 767 P.2d 1020, 1039, 255 Cal. Rptr.
542, 561 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
116. Cf. Keller v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990) (citing Ellis v. Railway Clerks,
466 U.S. 435, 455-57 (1984), for the proposition that the principles of Abood apply
equally to employees in the private sector); see also Beck v. Communications Workers of
Am., 776 F.2d 1187 (1985).
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ference with the right to vote.1 17 Furthermore, the negative phrasing of the first amendment, with its focus on state action,
presupposes the existence of certain common law political rights.' 1 8
Arguably, tortious interference with common law political rights
should encompass tortious interference with the right to associate
or not associate for political purposes. Such interference should be
actionable even without state action. If Mrs. Smith has a right, she
deserves a remedy." 9
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND OSERVATIONS

A. IOL TA
1. Survey of Political Uses
The author lacked the financial resources needed to acquire
enough unprocessed data relating to the national IOLTA income
stream to calculate the proportion of the stream that subsidizes
civil legal representation, class actions, rights-limiting legislation,
and other activities that fall outside the spirit of the preamble to
the Statute of Charitable Uses.' 20 This data probably cannot be
extrapolated from information currently on the public record. The
typical disclosure statement of a nonprofit organization, for example, does not reveal much about what portion, if any, of an IOLTA
grant directly or indirectly supports efforts to solicit and certify
plaintiffs in a class action. The IOLTA promotional literature itself, however, suggests that at least some portion of the IOLTA
income stream is directed to that purpose.' 2 ' A survey of political
uses of the national IOLTA income stream, conducted by an independent, nonpartisan body constituted especially for that purpose, would be helpful. Such a survey would provide context and
perspective for anyone wishing to pursue the first amendment and
fiduciary legal issues addressed in this article.
2.

Full and Fair Advance Disclosure

Regardless of whether such a systematic, independent, nonparti117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 865 (1979).
118. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
119. See Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1702). Of course, whether the
Institute is liable in damages to Mrs. Smith for interfering with her rights of political
association remains unclear. Surely, however, Mrs. Smith is entitled to injunctive relief.
120. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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san survey is conducted and its results published, a lawyer remains
charged with protecting the interests of his client in matters arising
out of the lawyer-client relationship. IOLTA is such a matter.
The literature generated by IOLTA administrators, however, falls
just short of advocating that lawyer-trustees conceal from their settlor-beneficiary clients information regarding recipients of IOLTA
income grants.' 2 2 Repeatedly, the lawyer-trustee is assured that,
unless asked, he has no duty to disclose such information.1 3 The
pronouncements of IOLTA bureaucracies notwithstanding, a lawyer-trustee who participates, voluntarily or by compulsion, in an
IOLTA program has a fiduciary, 124 ethical,15 and perhaps moral
obligation to ascertain the ultimate recipients of income from the
IOLTA pool. The lawyer-trustee also has a duty to fully inform his
settlor-beneficiary client of any possible political uses of that income, despite the "nominal" character of the client's temporary
contribution to the pool. A lawyer-trustee who fails to reveal, until
asked, his compelled or voluntary involvement in matters that affect a client's rights of free speech and political association comes
perilously close to engaging in behavior inappropriate and unbecoming of a person who occupies a position of trust.
3.

Accountability

As a matter of state trust law, the IOLTA system is accountable
to clients, who are not only settlors but also beneficiaries, for the
administration of the IOLTA income stream. As a practical matter, there can be no effective independent accountability in the administration of IOLTA programs that operate by judicial fiat.
Such programs might not be subject to, for example, Freedom of
Information Act requests or even the normal processes of discov122. For example, the Massachusetts Bar Association IOLTA Committee, in a pamphlet distributed to members of the Massachusetts Bar, addressed the issue of disclosure.
[Q] Must clients receive notice of our enrollment in the IOLTA Program?
[A] No notice is required. Nor do clients have any decision to make as to the
destination of funds which cannot be placed at interest for them. However,
discussions with clients will continue to include matters traditionally raised in a
lawyer's determination of whether a client's deposit justifies placement in an
interest-bearing account. There is no prohibition against a lawyer or a firm
advising all clients of the existence and purposes of IOLTA.
IOLTA COMMITTEE, MASS. BAR ASS'N, IOLTA: ALL LAWYERS MUST COMPLY BY

1, 1990 (copy on file with the author); cf. Indiana State Bar Petition, supra note
36, at 314 (expressing dismay at the fact that most IOLTA programs do not require
disclosure to the client).
123. Id.
124. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
JANUARY
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ery. Therefore, whether a client has a remedy in the face of unauthorized political exploitation of IOLTA income is an issue that
needs further exploration.
B.

Social Investing

1. Full and Fair Disclosure
Each prospective trustee who intends to practice social investing
for political purposes should disclose fully all social investing principles and practices to a prospective settlor-benefactor. Otherwise,
the trustee's exploitation for political purposes of property voluntarily transferred by the settlor-benefactor would constitute a judicially enjoinable invasion of the settlor-benefactor's expectation
interest. Unless the settlor-benefactor reasonably could have expected that the trustee would undertake such activity, there is a
breach of trust.
2.

Express Language

With respect to charitable gifts in trust, an attorney general is a
politician vested with prosecutorial and enforcement discretion.
Thus the attorney general cannot be relied upon to respond to a
settlor-benefactor's pleas to take action against a trustee of a charitable trust who is using the settlor-benefactor's gift to pursue the
trustee's own political objectives, particularly when the trustee and
the attorney general share the same objectives. 126 Therefore, a prospective settlor-benefactor might consider having counsel insert
into the governing trust instrument a provision that reserves to the
settlor-benefactor and his postmortem designees the right to direct
the trustee to cease using the trust property for political purposes.
The settlor-benefactor might also consider allocating to himself
and his postmortem designees sole responsibility for reasonably determining what activity will be deemed political in nature for purposes of the trust's administration.
Such a provision should not violate public policy because engaging in nonincidental political activity falls outside the charter or
authority of most, if not all, charitable entities. 127 Moreover, the
recommended provision should not render a nonfraudulent transfer incomplete for income, gift, or estate tax purposes. Such a
transfer also should not be susceptible to attack either by the set126. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 108-09; see also Ames v. Attorney
General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955).
127. Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 108.
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tlor's surviving spouse or by the settlor's inter vivos or postmortem
of the
creditors because the provision would not limit the exercise 28
trustee's lawful administrative and discretionary authority.1
VI.

CONCLUSION

129
The use of a client's money for political purposes, no matter
how nominal the sum, under a state-authorized or state-mandated
IOLTA program unconstitutionally abridges the client's rights of
free speech and political association. The abridgement occurs unless the client, after full and fair disclosure, gives express permission for such use. The investment of a benefactor's charitable gift
in furtherance of political ends, a form of social investing, without
consent, violates first amendment rights of free speech and political
association if state action is involved. Where no state action is involved, such use arguably may be enjoined as a tortious act that
interferes with the benefactor's rights of free speech and political
association.

128. See generally Rounds, The Vulnerability of Trust Assets to Attack by the Deceased Settlor's Creditors,by the Commonwealth Should It Seek Reimbursementfor Medicaid Payments, and by the Spouse, 73 MASS. L. REV. 67 (1988).
129. Particularly for purposes relating to civil legal representation and law reform
involving substantive rights and privileges.

